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Modeling the U.S. Dairy Sector with Government Intervention 
Donald J. Liu, Harry M. Kaiser,
 
Timothy D. Mount, and Clan D. Forker l
 
The federal dairy price support program was enacted in 1949 as a 
means to improve farm prices and incomes. Under this program, the 
government attempts to support raw milk prices by buying an unlimited 
quantity of manufactured dairy products at the wholesale level whenever 
the market price falls below the announced government purchase price. 
The intervention of the government in this market has broad reaching 
effects not only on the farm level, but also on the wholesale and retail 
levels. The objectives of the paper are to: (1) investigate the 
implications of this type of intervention on the econometric 
specification of a structural model of the U.S. dairy industry, and (2) 
to examine the empirical ramifications of not using the appropriate 
specification in policy analyses. 
When considering how prices in the dairy sector are determined, 
the potential for government intervention introduces a special problem. 
Prices are determined by different forces depending upon whether the 
price established by competitive supply and demand conditions is above 
or below the government price floor. If the competitively determined 
market price for wholesale manufactured dairy products is above the 
government purchase price, a "market equilibrium" regime holds. In this 
I Donald J. Liu is an Assistant Professor in the Department of 
Economics at Iowa State University, Harry M. Kaiser is an Assistant 
Professor, Timothy D. Mount and Clan D. Forker are Professors in the 
Department of Agricultural Economics at Cornell University. 
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case, the observed wholesale manufactured price is the equilibrium price 
and hence government intervention does not influence the price formation 
process in the dairy sector. On the other hand, if the competitively 
determined market price is below the purchase price, then a "government 
support" regime holds. In this case, the observed wholesale 
manufactured price equals the government price and the government buys 
the excess supply at that level. Hence, government intervention 
influences the type of price formation process that operates in the 
market as well as the level of prices. 
Is the U.S. dairy sector really characterized by a mixture of the 
two regimes? Due to recent large amounts of annual government 
purchases, it is tempting to describe the dairy sector exclusively as a 
government support regime. However, this observation is not appropriate 
when examining the market on a quarterly or monthly basis, particularly 
prior to the 1980's. More importantly, using government purchases 
(rather than the relationship between the government price and market 
price) for regime identification is flawed for the dairy sector. Some 
specialized manufacturing plants package products according to 
government standards and are not equipped to sell in commercial markets 
even when the competitive price exceeds the government price. Using the 
price relationship as a criterion to identify regime, the results in 
Figure 1 show that the competitive regime held for 42% of the period 
1975-87. Even during the 1980's when dairy surpluses were relatively 
large, the competitive regime occurred in 22% of that sample. Hence, 
with data from 1975 through 1987, it appears that the two-regime system 
should be considered when specifying a model of the dairy sector. 
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To date, econometric studies of the dairy sector have not 
distinguished between the two regimes, and have instead assumed that the 
government regime always occurs (Kaiser, Streeter and Liu; LaFrance and 
de Gorter). Failure to account for switching between regimes raises the 
problem of selectivity bias, implying that conventional least squares 
estimates are biased and inconsistent. Furthermore, since a structural 
system of equations is involved, these problems are not limited to the 
market associated with the intervention. Bias from a single source can 
distort all equations in the system. The issue here is to determine 
whether these distortions are important for policy analysis. 
In the following sections, an econometric framework for estimating 
a two-regime dairy structural system is presented. Correcting for 
selectivity bias implies modifying the first stage of a conventional two 
stage least squares estimator, and providing an alternative set of 
instruments for the second stage. Since the conventional two stage 
least squares model is not nested in the bias-corrected model, 
Atkinson's test for non-nested models is used to determine which one is 
supported best by the data. It is shown that the bias-corrected model 
is supported in all equations, but the conventional model is rejected in 
four out of five equations. Finally, the ramifications of using the 
bias-corrected rather than conventional model in policy analyses are 
investigated by shocking policy variables in both models. The resulting 
impact on key endogenous variables are found to be significantly 
different between the two models. 
A Conceptual Framework 
The econometric model of the dairy industry consists of a farm, 
wholesale, and retail level. At the farm level, raw milk is produced 
Figure 1. Relationship Between the Wholesale Manufactured and 
Government Purchase Price, 1975-1987 
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and sold to wholesalers, who in turn process and sell it to retailers. 
Both wholesale and retail levels are divided into a manufactured and a 
fluid market. The construction is similar to a previous model by 
Kaiser, Streeter, and Liu in that milk products are divided into fluid 
and manufactured dairy products. However, the previous model only 
considered the retail and the farm levels. The extension to include a 
wholesale level in this study facilitates the incorporation of 
government intervention in the wholesale manufactured market. A 
schematic view of the various components of the dairy sector is in 
Figure 2. 
In the retail manufactured market, a general specification for 
supply, demand and the equilibrium condition can be written as: 
~rm(1.1) s 
(1.2) ~~m prm + ~~m Z~m + ~~m 
Qrm(1.3) 
where Q~m and Qdm are the retail manufactured quantity supplied and 
demanded; prm and pwm are the equilibrium retail manufactured price and 
wholesale manufactured price; Z~m and Z~m are vectors of exogenous 
supply and demand shifters pertaining to the retail manufactured market; 
and Qrm denotes the equilibrium retail manufactured quantity. 
The retail fluid supply, demand and equilibrium condition can be 
written following the form of the retail manufactured market as follows: 
(2.1) Qrf s arf prf s + ~~f pwf + rf Zrf ~s s + ~rf s 
(2.2) Qd f ~df prf + ~~f Zrf d + ~~f 
• 
(2.3) Q~f E Qrf 
~ 
where superscripts rf's and wf's represent the retail and wholesale 
fluid markets, respectively. 
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•Figure 2. Conceptual model of U.S. Dairy Market. 
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The wholesale manufactured supply, demand and equilibrium 
condition (without government purchases) are: 
."wm zwm + 'Lwm+ 
's S "S(3.1) 
(3.2) 
(3.3) Q~ + QSP + AINV 
where pII is the Class II price, QSP is the quantity of milk sold to the 
government by specialized plants, AINV is change in commercial 
inventories of manufactured products, and all other variables are 
similarly defined with superscript wm's denoting variables pertaining to 
the wholesale manufactured market. Equation (3.2) specifies that the 
wholesale manufactured demand should equal the equilibrium retail 
manufactured quantity as all the quantity variables are expressed on a 
milk equivalent basis. Finally, the variables QSP and AINV are treated 
as exogenous in this study because they comprise a very small and rather 
constant portion of manufactured quantity.2 
The wholesale fluid supply, demand and equilibrium condition can 
be written following the form of the wholesale manufactured market as 
follows: 
(4.1) Qwf s awf s pwf + ~~f (pII + d) + wf Zwf 1 s s + J.lwf s 
(4.2) Qdf Qrf 
(4.3) Qwf s Qdf 
where d is the exogenous Class I differential. All other variables are 
defined as above with superscript wf's denoting that the variables 
pertain to the wholesale fluid subsector. 
2 Even though the magnitude of commercial inventory changes over 
time, its first difference (AINV) appears to be stationary with a strong 
seasonal pattern. 
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The model is completed by imposing the following farm level 
equilibrium condition: 
(5) + Q~ + FUSE 
where Qmilk is the "predetermined" raw milk supply, and FUSE is on-farm 
use of milk, assumed to be exogenous. The farm supply is predetermined 
due to the standard assumption that dairy farmers' price expectations 
are based on lagged prices only (e.g., Chavas and Klemme; Kaiser, 
Streeter and Liu; LaFrance and de Gorter). In the case where Qmilk is 
endogenous, the farm supply equation should be estimated simultaneously 
with the rest of the system, but this does not change the essence of the 
discussion that follows. 
The wholesale manufactured price appearing in (1.1) and (3.1) is 
constrained by the dairy price support program. That is, since the 
government sets a purchase price for storable manufactured dairy 
products and is willing to buy surplus quantities of the products at 
that price, the following constraints holds: 
(6)
 
where pg is the aggregate government purchase price for the manufactured
 
products at the wholesale level.
 
When the government support regime holds, pwrn simply equals pg 
which is exogenous. However, the quantity of government purchases 
emerges as an additional endogenous variable balancing the number of 
equations with the number of unknowns. Accordingly, the equilibrium 
condition of (3.3) for the wholesale manufactured market becomes: 
Q~ + QSP + ~INV + QgQ~ 
where Qg is government purchases measured on a milk equivalent basis. 
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To summarize, the above system encompasses two possible regimes. 
In the case of the market equilibrium regime, the endogenous variables 
are: retail manufactured demand and supply and wholesale manufactured 
demand (Qam - Q~m - Q~), wholesale manufactured supply (Q~), retail 
and wholesale fluid supply and demand (Q~f _ Q~f _ Q~f _ Q~f), retail 
manufactured price (prm) , wholesale manufactured price (pWID) , retail 
fluid price (prf) , wholesale fluid price (pwf) , and Class II price 
(pII). The exogenous variables, denoted by Z, are: 
Z - (Z~m, zam, z~f, z~f, z~, z~f, Qmi1k, d, FUSE, QSP, ~INV) 
In the case of the government support regime, Qg replaces pWID as an 
endogenous variable in the above list, and the exogenous variables, 
denoted by Z*, are 
The Switching System Estimation Procedure 
Taking the unconditional expectation of the structural equations 
(1.1), (1.2), (2.1), (2.2), (3.1), and (4.1) yields: 
rm(7.1) E[Qrm] arm E[prm] + ,e~m E[pWID] + Zrm s s "Is s 
rm Zrm(7.2) E[Q~m] ,e~m E[prm] + "Id d 
(7.3) E[Qrf] orf E[prf] + ,erf E[pwf] + "Irf Zrf s s s s s 
(7.4) E[Q~f] ,e~f E[prf] + rf Zrf"Id d 
WID WIDE[pWID] ,eWID E[pII] ZWID(7.5) E[Q~] Os + s + "Is s 
(7.6) E[Qwf] wf E[pwf] + ,ewf (E [pI! ] + d) + wf Zwf s Os s "Is s 
The estimation procedure is analogous to conventional two-stage 
least squares, consisting of the following two steps. The first step is 
to estimate the expected prices in the right-hand-side of (7.1) - (7.6) 
to be used as price instruments. Once the price instruments are 
obtained, the second step involves a straightforward application of 
9 
l-~ • PROB (pWUI > pg) 
Assuming that £WU1 is normally distributed, a consistent estimate of 
E[pWUlI pWUI > pg] can be obtained by using a maximum likelihood Tobit 
procedure on (8.1) and can be expressed as (Maddala, p. 160): 
Wffi(9) w Z + 0 (¢(c)/[l-~(c)]} 
where ~(c) and ¢(c) are the cumulative standard normal and the standard 
Wffinormal density, both evaluated at c which is defined as (Pg - w Z) / 0 
2and 0 is Var[£Wffi]. The last term in (9) is the Heckman correction term 
for selectivity bias. 
Making use of the definition of ~, the unconditional expectation 
(i.e., the instrument) of the wholesale manufactured price in (7.1) and 
(7.5) is: 
(10)
 
Then, by substituting (9) into (10), the price instrument for the 
wholesale manufactured price is: 
(11) 
Now consider the reduced form equations for the unconstrained 
prices (i.e., retail manufactured price, retail fluid price, wholesale 
fluid price, and Class II price) in (8.2) and (8.2*). Combining the two 
reduced form equations for the two solution regimes weighted by their 
respective probabilities, and taking the unconditional expectation of 
the resulting expression yields: 
(12)	 E[pi] & (l-~) (~i Z + E[£ i I pWffi > pg]) 
i
+ ~ (~* Z* + E[£ll pWffi 5 pg)} 
Assuming the joint density of £Wffi and £i is bivariate normal and making 
use of (8.1), the following holds: 3 
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E[fi\ fWID > pg _ ~WID Z](13) 
(ai/a) {¢(c)/[l-~(c)]} 
iwhere a is COV[fWID fi].
 
Similarly, assuming the joint density of fWID and f; is bivariate normal
 
and making use of (8.1), the following holds:
 
E[f;1 fWID ~ pg _ ~WID Z](14) 
- (a;la) {¢(c)/~(c)} 
where a; is COV[fWID f;]. 
The price instrument for the retail manufactured price may be 
obtained by substituting (13) and (14) into (12) to give: 
(15)
 
With estimates of~, ¢, and a from the Tobit estimation in (9), the 
parameters ~i, i and (ai_a;) in (15) can be estimated by ordinary~*, 
least squares with the observed values of pi replacing E[pi] in (15). 
To summarize, rather than regressing each endogenous variable on 
all exogenous variables to obtain the price instrument, the reduced form 
equation for the wholesale manufactured price should be estimated by a 
Tobit procedure while those for other endogenous prices should be fitted 
to a weighted average of the exogenous variables from each regime with a 
Heckman-like correction term appended. 
Tests Against the Conventional Model 
To investigate whether the above bias-corrected procedure matters 
empirically, the following tests can be applied to the reduced form 
3 Assuming that the joint density of x and y is bivariate normal 
with zero means, Johnson and Kotz show that 
E[XI y > z] - {COV[x,y] I SD[y] } { ¢(E) I (l~ ~(E» }, and 
E[x y < z] - - { COV[x,y] I SD[y] } { ¢(O I ~(O }, 
where COV and SD are the covariance and standard deviation operators and 
E is defined as z/SD[y]. 
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equations. With respect to the wholesale manufactured price reduced 
form equation in (9), the second term on the right-hand-side is the 
Heckman correction term for selectivity bias. Hence, a t-test for the 
estimate of 0 can be used to determine the existence of the bias if 
ordinary least squares is used instead of the Tobit procedure. 
With respect to the remaining four unconstrained price reduced 
form equations in (15), a procedure based on the Atkinson non-nested 
models test is used to compare models (Judge et. al., p438). 
Specifically, there are two non-nested models that need to be compared; 
the bias-corrected model represented by (15) and the conventional two-
stage least squares reduced form model which is: 
i(16) ~* 
Following Atkinson, a comprehensive model composed of both (15) and 
(16) is constructed to test the two competing models. The comprehensive 
model is obtained by augmenting the government purchase price (Pg) into 
the exogenous vector Z in the first term of (15): 
(17)
 + ~i
* 
where the augmented parameter vector ~~ contains ~i and an additional 
parameter (~i) for the government purchase price. 
The bias-corrected model in (15) can be obtained by imposing the 
following single restriction on the comprehensive model (17): 
(18) o 
An F-test on (18) can be used to determine the appropriateness of the 
bias-corrected model. Similarly, an F-test on the following set of 
restrictions can be used to determine the appropriateness of the 
conventional model in (16): 
~i _ ~i(19) o 
a * 
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The Estimation Results 
Based on the conceptual model, there are six structural equations 
that need to be estimated including: retail fluid demand, retail 
manufactured demand, retail fluid supply, wholesale fluid supply, retail 
manufactured supply, and wholesale manufactured supply. These equations 
are estimated simultaneously by the switching regime estimation 
procedure discussed above using quarterly data from 1975 through 1987. 
A detailed description of the data and their sources can be found in 
Liu. et a1. (a). 
The retail fluid and manufactured demand equations are estimated 
on a per capita basis, while the retail and wholesale supply equations 
are estimated on a total quantity basis because population is not a 
supply determinant. Both demand equations are expressed as functions of 
their own price, per capita income, price of substitutes, advertising, 
time trend, harmonic seasonal variables, and other shifters. The supply 
equations are expressed as functions of their own price, input prices, 
lagged supply, harmonic seasonal variables, and other shifters. The 
estimation results are in Table 1. All the estimated coefficients have 
correct signs and are significant at conventional confidence levels (as 
indicated by the t-va1ues in parentheses). The adjusted R-squared, 
Durbin-Watson statistics, and Durbin-h statistics suggest good fit of 
the data. A more specific explanation of the equations follows. 
Per capita retail fluid demand (Q~f/POP) is estimated as a 
function of the ratio of fluid milk price index (prf ) to per capita 
income (INC); the ratio of retail non-alcoholic beverage price index 
(PBEV) to per capita income; deflated generic fluid advertising 
Table 1: Estimated Structural Equations (The Bias-Corrected Model) 
Reta. In Qrf 
-
- 2.236 - 0.282 In (prfIINC) + 0.154 In (PBEV/INC) + .0025 In DGFAd 
Fluid (-14.88) (-2.34) (2.31) (2.01) 
Demand 
+ 0.004 In DGFA + 0.0045 In DGFA + 0.004 In DGFA + 0.0025 In DGFA
-1 -2 -3 -4 
(2.01 ) (2.01) (2.01) (2.01) 
rf 
- 0.179 In TIME - 0.028 SINl + 0.083 COSl + 0.517 u + In POPd 
(-6.79) (-3.60) (10.70) (3.24)-1 
2Adj. R - 0.88 Durbin-Watson - 1.84 
Reta. In Qrm ~ - 2.467 - 0.928 In (prm/INC) + 0.645 In (PMEA/INC) + 0.0009 1n DGMA d 
Manu. (-10.42) (-2.68) (2.29) (1.64) 
Demand 
+ 0.0014 In DGMA_ + 0.0016 In DGMA_ + 0.0014 In DGMA_ + 0.0009 In DGMA_l 2 3 4 
(1.64) (1.64) (1.64) (1.64) 
- 1.436 In DPAFH + 0.071 In TIME - 0.050 SINl - 0.085 COS1 + In POP 
(-2.09) (2.64) (-4.92) (-8.29) 
2Adj. R - 0.85 Durbin-Watson 2.07 
Reta. In Qrf _ 2.809 + 0.940 In (prf/pwf ) - 0.111 In (PFE/pwf ) - 0.015 UNEMP 
s
 
Flui. (6.00) (1.82) (-3.68) (-3.95)
 
Supply 
+ 0.237 In Qrf - 0.227 1n Qrf 
- 0.001 TIME - 0.052 SIN1 + 0.094 COS1 
s s 
- 1 -4(1.76) (-1.98) (-1.90) (-3.90) (8.14) 
2Adj. R - 0.90 Durbin-h ~ 1.60 
Whol. In QWf ~ 2.184 + 0.381 In (pWf/(pII+d» - 0.093 1n (PFE/(pII+d» -.016 UNEMP 
s
 
Flui. (4.03) (2.66) (-2.85) (-3.98)
 
Supply 
+ 0.240 In QWf - 0.223 In QWf 
- 0.003 TIME - 0.050 SINl + 0.094 COS1 
s s 
-1 -4(1. 79) (-1.96) (-3.74) (-3.74) ( 8 . 18 ) 
0.90 Durbin-h ~ 1.13 
Reta. In Qrm _ - 1.507 + 0.683 In (prm/p wm ) - 0.334 In (MWAGE/p wm ) - 0.042 COS1 
s 
Manu. (-1.69) (2.37) (-1.51) (-2.78) 
Supply 
+ 0.163 In Qrm + 0.581 1n Qrm 
s s 
-1 -4 R2(2.21) (6.55) Adj. ~ 0.93 Durbin-h - 1.36 
Whol. In Qwm ~ 0.528 + 0.870 In (pwm/p II ) - 0.544 In (MWAGE/pII) - 0.122 POLICY 
s
 
Manu. (2.70) (1.50) (-2.86) (-4.37)
 
Supply 
Qwm Qwm 2+ 0.301 In + 0.351 In + 0.00017 TIME + o .077 SIN1 - O. 125 COS1 
s s 
-1 -4(3.40) ( 4 . 15) (4.29) (4.08) (-6.42) 
wm
+ 0.751 u 
s 
~( 4 . 05) -1 Adj. R2 0.96 Durbin-h 
-
0.25 
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index is a proxy for the price of manufactured product substitutes. The 
away from horne price index is included because a large portion of cheese 
is consumed away from horne. The trend variable measures the increase in 
consumer preferences for cheese and yogurt; unlike fluid product, 
consumers do not perceive manufactured products such as cheese as high 
fat products even though they contain as much fat as whole milk (Cook, 
etal.,p.9). 
Retail fluid supply (Qr;) is estimated as a function of the ratio 
of retail fluid price index to wholesale fluid price index (pwf); the 
ratio of fuels and energy price index (PFE) to wholesale fluid price 
index; lagged supply; unemployment rate (UNEMP); a time trend; and the 
harmonic seasonal variables. The specification of the retail to 
wholesale price ratio and energy price to wholesale price ratio is 
consistent with the zero homogeneity assumption for prices. The 
wholesale fluid and energy prices represent two of the most important 
costs in fluid retailing. The two lagged dependent variables are 
included to capture short and longer term production capacity 
constraints. 6 The unemployment rate is used as a proxy for the state of 
the economy. The time trend is included to capture other determinants 
of supply such as labor costs in the retail fluid sector, which are 
unavailable. 
Wholesale fluid supply (Qw;) is estimated as a function of the 
ratio of wholesale fluid price index to Class I price for raw milk (pI = 
6 The eigenvalues for this dynamic system have real parts all less 
than one in absolute value indicating the equation is stable. The 
stability condition is also satisfied for other dynamic supply equations 
to be presented. 
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pII + d); the ratio of fuels and energy price index to Class I price; 
lagged supply; unemployment rate; a time trend; and the harmonic 
seasonal variables. The Class I price is included because it represents 
the most important cost in fluid wholesaling. 
Retail manufactured supply (Q;m) is estimated as a function of the 
ratio of retail manufactured price to wholesale manufactured price 
(PWID ); the ratio of average hourly wage rate in the manufactured sector 
(MWAGE) to wholesale manufactured price; lagged supply; and a harmonic 
seasonal variable. The wholesale manufactured price accounts for the 
largest portion of variable costs, and the manufactured wage rate 
measures labor costs in manufactured retailing. The energy price and 
unemployment rate were included in the initial estimation of this 
equation, but are subsequently omitted due to their coefficients being 
the wrong sign. Also, the trend variable and SINI are omitted due to 
their coefficients are insignificant. The exclusion of TIME and SINI 
does not change the results of the estimation significantly. 
Wholesale manufactured supply (Q~) is estimated as a function of 
the ratio of wholesale manufacturing price to Class II price (pII ); the 
ratio of manufactured wage to Class II price; lagged supply; a policy 
dummy variable (POLICY); a time trend; and the harmonic seasonal 
variables. The Class II price is included because it represents the 
most important variable cost in manufactured wholesaling. The policy 
dummy variable (equal to 1 for the first quarter of 1984 through the 
second quarter of 1985 and the second quarter of 1986 through the third 
quarter of 1987) accounts for the significant reductions in raw milk 
supply due to the implementation of the Milk Diversion Program and the 
Dairy Termination Program, which had the largest impact on the wholesale 
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manufactured market. A first order moving average error structure is 
imposed to correct for serial correlation in the residuals. All the 
coefficients remain stable after imposing the moving average term. 
Tests for Selectivity Bias in the Conventional Model 
As previously indicated, a significant t-statistic for the 
coefficient (0) on the Heckman correction term in (9) signifies the 
existence of selectivity bias in the wholesale manufactured price 
reduced form equation if ordinary least squares (instead of Tobit) is 
used. The t-statistic for the estimated 0 is 5.24 using a Heckman two­
step estimation procedure (Maddala, p. 159).7 This supports the 
statistical relevancy of the Tobit procedure for the constrained 
wholesale manufactured price reduced form equation. 
The tests for the remaining four reduced form equations of the 
unconstrained prices (retail fluid price, retail manufactured price, 
wholesale fluid price, and Class II price) are based on the Atkinson 
procedure discussed in (15) to (19). The P-values for the F-statistics 
are presented in Table 2. At the 95% confidence level, the bias­
corrected model cannot be rejected for all the four equations. On the 
other hand, the conventional model is rejected for all of the price 
reduced forms except the retail fluid price. The result that the 
conventional model cannot be rejected for the retail fluid price is not 
that surprising because this market probably has the weakest linkage to 
the supported wholesale manufactured market. 
The above tests provide statistical evidence that selectivity-bias 
• 
is not simply a problem for the price directly influenced by government 
The t ratio for the estimate of 0 using maximum likelihood is 6.4. 7 
Table 2: F Tests for the Price Reduced Form Equations 
Bias-Corrected Model Conventional Model 
Equation F(1,6) P-Va1ue !...../ F(22,6) P-Va1ue 
Retail Fluid Price (prf ): 0.22 0.66 1. 54 0.31 
Retail Manuf. Price (p rm): 0.61 0.47 4.21 0.04 
(REJECTED) 
Wholesale Fluid Price (pwf ): 3.09 0.13 4.87 0.03 
(REJECTED) 
Wholesale manuf. Price (Pwm ): 
(REJECTED)** / 
Class II Price (pII ): 0.83 0.40 5.52 0.02 
(REJECTED) 
!...../ At (1 - 0) % confidence level, one rejects the model if the P-va1ue is 
less than o. 
~/ Based on the t-ratio on the Heckman-like correction term in equ. (9). 
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intervention. It also affects other price reduced form equations in the 
system. 
Empirical Implications for Policy Analysis 
While the selectivity bias of the conventional model has been 
shown to exist, it is useful to examine the differences in the 
magnitudes of estimated structural parameters between the two models. 
It is also useful to investigate whether the two models generate 
different policy conclusions. To provide the basis for these 
comparisons, the conventional model is estimated using two stage least 
squares assuming the government purchase price is always binding. The 
estimation results are presented in Table 3. 
The estimated structural equations are similar to those of the 
bias-corrected model with respect to goodness of fit, t-values, Durbin­
Watson and Durbin-h statistics. The major difference between the two 
models lies in the magnitudes of the price coefficients. In general, 
the conventional model has smaller own price coefficients in the demand 
equations and larger price coefficients in the supply equations. For 
example, the own price coefficients in the retail manufactured supply 
equations are 0.897 for the conventional model and 0.683 for the bias­
corrected model. On the other hand, the own price coefficients in the 
retail manufactured demand equations are -0.655 for the conventional 
model and -0.928 for the bias-corrected model. 
To investigate whether the two models generate different policy 
conclusions, dynamic impulse analyses are conducted on the conventional 
and the bias-corrected models. Two policy variables are of interest: 
the government purchase price (Pg) and the Class I differential (d). 
The levels of these two variables are of interest because they have been 
Table 3: Estimated Structural Equations (The Conventional Model) 
Qrf .Reta. 1n - 2.253 - 0.267 1n (prf/INC) + 0.149 1n (PBEV/INC) + .0025 1n DGFAd 
Fluid (-14.61) (-2.13) (2.17) <1.96) 
Demand 
+ 0.004 1n DGFA + 0.0045 1n DGFA + 0.004 1n DGFA + 0.0025 1n DGFA
-1 -2 -3	 -4 
(1.96) (1.96)	 <1.96) (1.96) 
- 0.176 1n TIME - 0.028 SIN1 + 0.082 COS1 + 0.502 u~f + In POP 
(-6.46) (-3.54) (10.51) (3.15)-1 
2Adj. R • 0.87 Durbin-Watson 1.85E 
Reta. 1n Qrm • - 2.601 - 0.655 1n (prm/INC) + 0.432 1n (PMEA/INC) + 0.0008 1n DGMA d 
Manu. (-10.97) (-1.85) (1.55) (1.30) 
Demand 
+ 0.0013 1n	 DGMA_ + 0.0014 1n DGMA_ + 0.0013 In DGMA_ + 0.0008 1n DGMA_1 2 3	 4 
(1.30)	 (1.30) (1.30) (1.30) 
- 1.061 1n DPAFH + 0.082 1n TIME - 0.050 SIN1 - 0.085 COS1 + 1n POP 
(-1.48) (2.82) (-4.71) (-7.98) 
Adj. R2 0.84 Durbin-Watson 2.08E	 E 
Reta. 1n Qrf _ 2.856 + 1.108 1n (prf/pwf) - 0.111 1n (PFE/pwf) - 0.016 UNEMP 
s 
F1ui. (6.17) (1.98) (-3.74) (-4.06) 
Supply 
+ 0.230 In Qrf - 0.245 1n Qrf 
- 0.001 TIME - 0.052 SIN1 + 0.096 COS1 
s	 s 
-1	 -4(1.73 ) (-2.13) ( -1 . 74) (-3.94) (8.23 ) 
2Adj. R - 0.90 Durbin-h - 1.75 
Who1. 1n QWf 1.950 + 0.461 1n (pWf/(pII+ d » - 0.085 1n (PFE/(pII+ d » -.016 UNEMPE 
s
 
F1ui. (3.30) (2.72) (-2.49) (-4.08)
 
Supply 
+ 0.221 1n QWf - 0.203 1n QWf 
- 0.003 TIME - 0.047 SIN1 + 0.093 COS1 
s	 s 
-1	 -4( 1 . 66) (-1.83) ( - 3.77 ) (-3.44) ( 8 . 33 ) 
Adj. R2 • 0.90 Durbin-h· 1.13 
Reta. 1n Qrm - 2.197 + 0.900 1n (prm/pwm) - 0.506 1n (MWAGE/pwm) - 0.045 COS1E 
s 
Manu. (-2.09) (2.64) (-1.96) (-2.95) 
Supply 
+	 0.167 1n Qrm + 0.560 1n Qrm
 
s 
-1 
s
-4 2
 
E(2.30 ) ( 6.20 ) Adj. R = 0.93 Durbin-h 1.36 
0.285 + 1.117 1n (pwm/pII) - 0.431 1n (MWAGE/pII) - 0.113 POLICY 
Manu. (1.41) (1.19) (-2.26) (-3.83) 
Supply 
2 
Who1. 
+ 0.422 1n Qwm + 0.335 1n Qwm + 0.00014 TIME + 0.100 SIN1 - 0.123 COS1 
s	 s 
- 1	 -4( 5 . 01) ( 3 . 76) ( 3 . 30 ) ( 4 . 74 ) (-6.14) 
wm
+ 0.617 u 
s 2(3.54) -1	 Adj. R • 0.96 Durbin-h 0.25E 
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the key policy instruments set by Congress and the Administration in the 
1985 and the proposed 1990 farm bills. It is assumed that the dairy 
sector is in a steady state in which all the variables are set at a 
three year average of 1985 to 1987. The two models are shocked with a 
permanent 10% increase in the government purchase price and the impacts 
on the endogenous variables are simulated for 20 quarters. A similar 
analysis is conducted with a 10% shock in the Class I differential. The 
models are solved using Gauss-Seidel method.8 
In general, the endogenous variables converge to a new steady 
state within two years regardless of which model is used. In addition, 
the pattern of the convergence from the two models is similar for most 
variables. However, the level of the time paths differ significantly 
for some variables, as illustrated in Figure 3a-3d. In these figures, 
the pre-shock steady state (quarters -4 to -1) and the adjustment paths, 
resulting from the shock (at quarter 0), for the Class II price and 
government purchases are presented. With a permanent 10% shock in the 
government purchase price, the Class II price in the conventional and 
bias-corrected model reaches a new steady state of $13.40 and $15.12, 
respectively, from an old steady state of $11.33 (Figure 3a). With a 
permanent 10% shock in the Class I differential, government purchases 
decrease from an old steady state of 2.54 billion pounds per quarter to 
1.64 and 1.40 billion pounds, respectively, which represents an annual 
8 The farm milk supply (Qmilk) in equation (5) is fixed at the three 
year average level. To allow for a future farm milk supply response due 
to a policy change, one needs to estimate an equation for the 
predetermined farm milk supply as a function of last period's farm milk 
price, which in turn is a function of last period's Class II price, 
Class I differential, and commercial wholesale fluid and manufactured 
quantities. See Liu, et al. for an example of this more detailed 
simulation model. 
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Figure 3a. Impact of 10"10 Permanent Shock in the Govemment Purchase 
Price on the Class" Price. 
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Figure 3c. Impact of 10% Permanent Shock in the Government Purchase 
Price on Government Quantity. 
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Figure 3b.	 Impact of 10% Permanent Shock in the Class I Differential on 
Government Quantity. 
Class II Price 
(S/cwl.) 
12.60 
12.40 
12_20 
,12.00 t \	 Bias-Corrected 
11.80 
11.60 t 1/	 Convenllonal 
11.40 "
 
11.20 
11.00	 I I I I I I I , I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I
 
·4 - 3 - 2 - 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 1920
 
Quarter 
Figure 3d. Impact of 10"10 Permanent Shock In the Class I Differential on 
the Class" Price. 
19
 
difference of about one billion pounds between the two models (Figure 
3b). 
However, the differences between models are not dramatic for all 
variables. For example, with a permanent 10% shock in the government 
purchase price, government quantity in the conventional and bias­
corrected model reaches a new steady state of 2.24 and 2.29 billion 
pounds per quarter, respectively (Figure 3c). Also, with a permanent 
10% shock in the Class I differential, the Class II price increases from 
an old steady state of $11.33 to $11.51 and $11.89 for the two models, 
respectively (Figure 3d). It should be noted that while the absolute 
differences are small, the relative differences may be large. For 
instance, the later case indicates that a 10% increase in the Class I 
differential results in a 2.5% increase in the Class II price when the 
conventional model is used; while this shock results in double that 
increase (5%) when the bias-corrected model is used. 
The above results apply to most of the other endogenous variables 
as well indicating that economic analysis of the dairy sector based on 
the conventional model may yield policy prescriptions that are 
substantially different from those based on the bias-corrected model. A 
similar conclusion is found when shocking other exogenous variables 
(e.g., income and advertising) and when different initial steady state 
values (other than the 1985-1987 averages) for the variables in the 
model are used in the simulation. For additional empirical policy 
results using the bias-corrected model, see Liu, et al. (b). 
Summary 
This paper presented a multiple market switching simultaneous 
system model for the dairy sector. It was argued that this model is 
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necessary for the dairy sector in order to deal with selectivity bias 
caused by switching between two regimes: (1) a government support 
regime which exists when the price determined by competitive supply and 
demand conditions is below the government stipulated price, and (2) a 
market equilibrium regime which otherwise occurs. The estimation 
procedure for the system is similar to conventional two-stage least 
squares in that an instrument is first obtained from the reduced form 
equation and then is substituted into the structural equation 
estimation. However, special procedures are needed for the reduced form 
estimation in order to correct for selectivity bias. 
In general, both the bias-corrected and the conventional two stage 
least squares models fit the data reasonably well. However, based on 
the Heckman two-step and Atkinson non-nested test results, the 
restrictions required for the conventional model are not supported by 
the data. It was shown that selectivity bias is not only apparent in 
the component of the system directly affected by government 
intervention, but also exists in other markets in the dairy sector. In 
addition, the results from the impulse analyses indicate that economic 
analysis of the dairy sector based on the conventional model may yield 
policy prescriptions that are substantially different from those based 
on the bias-corrected model. 
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